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Abstract
A well known character of nonmonotonic reasoning is that it allows for multiple conclusion sets. Choice
perspective selects one of the conclusions, and skeptical perspective uses the intersection of all of the
conclusions. In this paper, we purchase a medium approach between the two perspective, i.e., it selects
some conclusions and uses the intersection of them. Such an approach is very similar with partial meet
approach to belief revision. Therefore, we will introduce a variation of Olsson’s additive consolidation,
which is one of the coherentist studies of belief revision, and consider it as an operation for the medium
approach to nonmonotonic reasoning. Finally, using Nixon diamond example, we compare it with the
skeptical perspective for the usual default logic.
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1 Introduction
A well-known character of nonmonotonic reasoning is that it allows for multiple
conclusion sets, known as extensions. Given a set A of premises, let e(A) be the
set of all extensions of A. When e(A) includes plural extensions, how should we
decide a consequence set of A? There are generally three approaches to the problem
in the literature. First, we should select a particular one from e(A). Second, the
intersection ∩e(A) of all the extensions of A should be a consequence set of A.
Third, the union ∪e(A) of all the extensions of A should be a consequence set of
A. Makinson [16] called the ﬁrst approach choice perspective, the second approach
sceptical perspective, and the third approach liberal perspective. 3 Of the three
approach, the liberal one is usually not favored, because multiple extensions arise
when they consist of conﬂicting default assumptions, and the union of them is
inconsistent. The choice one also seems to be diﬃcult, because the choice mechanism
1 This research is conducted as a program for the “21st Century COE Program” by Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
2 Email: syoshita@jaist.ac.jp
3 However, the third approach is often called credulous perspective (c.f.,[11]).
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is often assumed to be arbitrary, and such a choice leads nonmonotonic reasoning
to very irregular behavior. It follows that the skeptical one seems to be more useful
for the study of nonmonotonic reasoning than the other two. In fact, Makinson
[16] researched that the skeptical perspective in the various types of nonmonotonic
reasoning (e.g., default reasoning [20] and its kin, maxiconsistent sets [19], etc.)
satisﬁed some intersting rational postulates in [13,15,16], and this study helped us
to appreciate the diﬀerences between the various types.
In this paper, we will study a variation of Olsson’s additive consolidation [18]
for the quest of a medium point between choice and skeptical perspective. In the
medium perspective, when we encounter the set e(A) of multiple extensions of A,
we should select some elements from e(A) by some choice function σ, and the
intersection ∩σ(e(A)) of the selected extension of A should be a consequence set
of A. Such an approach can be compared with the paradigm of AGM’s belief
revision [1]. Belief revision is an operation that eliminates some information from
a knowledge base as minimal as possible, and incorporate an input, where the old
knowledge base may be inconsistent with the input. However, there are many
alternative ways of eliminating information. In the situation, belief revision selects
some best alternative ways, and decides that the intersection of them is an unique
result. 4
This similarity between our additive consolidation and AGM belief revision is
very natural, because additive consolidation has been developed from belief revision.
Originally, consolidation was one of variations of belief revision proposed by Hans-
son [8], which subtracted parts of inconsistent knowledge and made the knowledge
consistent. Olsson [18], however, thought that consolidation should be an operator
which subtracted parts of incoherent knowledge and made the knowledge coherent.
5 In addition to subtractive consolidation, Olsson [18] also developed additive con-
solidation, which added some information to incoherent knowledge and made the
knowledge coherent. His study was inspired by Klein and Warﬁeld [14]. We consider
that nonmonotonic reasoning assumes such a consolidating process, i.e., when we
have incomplete information about world, we add some assumptions and construct
more complete view about world. Bochman [3] declared that the necessity of non-
monotonic reasoning was not the question of speeding or simplifying our reasoning,
as was sometimes supposed in artiﬁcial intelligence, but rather, it was a matter of
vital necessity.
Human rational activity is not reducible to collecting facts and deriving their
consequences; it embodies an active epistemic attitude that involves making as-
sumptions and wholesale theories about the world and acting in accordance with
them. In other words, we do not only perceive the world, we also give it structure
in order to make it intelligible and controllable. [3]
4 Makinson and Ga¨rdenfors [17,6] indicated that there was some direct translation from belief revision to
nonmonotonic reasoning, and showed the correspondence between the postulates for belief revision [1] and
the postulates for nonmonotonic reasoning [13,15]. We will show that our additive consolidation functions
are equivalent with the various postulates for nonmonotonic reasoning.
5 Olsson’s article is related with the coherentist approach to belief revision. However, it is not our subject,
and we do not introduce the diﬀerence between coherentism and foundationalism in belief revision. For the
topic, see [5,18,9,10].
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Our problem is how to make such wholesale theories that support rational ac-
tivity. In this paper, we will develop a variation of Olsson’s additive consolidation,
and show that it satisﬁes rational postulates for nonmonotonic reasoning [13,15,16]
when its selection mechanism satisﬁes rational postulates for choice function [21],
and vice versa. Rott [21] indicated that these postulates for choice function were
developed by various economists (e.g., [2,22]), and they could be related with ratio-
nal postulates for belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning. We will show that
they can not only be related with, but also be the core of a rational nonmonotonic
reasoning operation. 6
What is the diﬀerence between Olsson’s additive consolidation and our one?
Olsson [18] assumes the principle of minimal change. In the study of belief revision,
this principle means conservatism, i.e., We do not want to eliminate our old belief
unnecessarily. In the additive setting, however, it means “we should instead demand
that no belief is added in the absence of good reasons to add it [18].” We will not
assume such a principle, but we will instead use the principle of maximal change,
i.e., an assumption should be added in the absence of bad reasons to add it. We
consider that our additive consolidation consists of three steps. First, according
to the principle of maximal change, it constructs too big theories, called maximal
consistent set, from an original theory. The theories are regarded as extensions.
Second, by some choice function, it selects best alternative theories from the set
of extensions. Third, according to skeptical perspective, the intersection of best
theories should be a consolidated theory of the original theory. If the choice function
in the second step would be rational, the additive consolidation’s behavior would
be equal to the rational way of nonmonotonic reasoning.
This paper’s organization is as follows. Rational postulates of additive consol-
idation are introduced in Section 2. Some parts of the postulates are the same
with the postulates for nonmonotonic reasoning. Partial meet approach to additive
consolidation is proposed, and representation theorem is shown, in Section 3. Ratio-
nal postulates of choice function are introduced, and representation theorem about
choice function is shown, in Section 4. We will show that there is a correspondence
between choice function and order relation, and compare our additive consolidation
with the usual default logic in Section 5. To use the Nixon diamond example, we
can explain that our consolidation is diﬀerent from the skeptical perspective with
usual default logic. Finally, we discuss the problem and our future works, in Section
6. By the way, whereas many issues about belief revision use the word ‘consolida-
tion’ as the subtractive one, we will not develop it in this paper. Therefore, in the
following discussion, this word will be used as the additive one.
6 Our consolidation, developed in the following discussion, is very similar with Rott’s choice-based inference
relation [21]. However, there are two diﬀerences. Firstly, we show that possible worlds are constructed from
a syntax theory, while Rott’s approach is based on semantics from the beginning. Secondly, we consider
that several possible worlds are concluded from a premise, while he considers that each of possible worlds
satisﬁes a premise.
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2 Rational Postulates of Consolidation
We introduce some of notations. In the following discussion, L is used as a logically
ﬁnite language, i.e., the set of propositional variables is ﬁnite, and the propositional
connectives are ∧, ∨, → and ↔. We will usually use lower case letters as sentences
over L, and upper case letters as sets of sentences over P(L). However, C is used as
a consolidation operation. C(A) means “C consolidates a theory A, and constructs
a coherent theory.” Also a consequence operator Cn on the language L is a function
which satisﬁes the following conditions for all A and B: (i) A ⊆ Cn(A) (inclusion),
(ii) if A ⊆ B, then Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B) (monotonicity), (iii) Cn(Cn(A)) ⊆ Cn(A)
(idempotence), (iv) Cn0(A) ⊆ Cn(A), where Cn0 is classical propositional logic
(supraclassicality), (v) if y ∈ Cn(A ∪ {x}), then x → y ∈ Cn(A) (deduction),
and (vi) if x ∈ Cn(A), then there is a ﬁnite set A′ ⊆ A such that x ∈ Cn(A′)
(compactness). When A = Cn(A), i.e., A is logically closed by Cn, we say that A is
a belief set. In the following discussion, we use the word ‘coherence’ in the meaning
of Ga¨rdenfors [4,5], although Ga¨rdenfors’s approach to coherentism is criticized by
various issues [18,9,10]. That is to say, a theory A is coherent iﬀ (i) A is a belief set
and (ii) A is consistent.
Now we enumerate rational postulates of consolidation, and discuss the ratio-
nality of them. We suppose the postulates as follows.
(AC1) If A is consistent, then C(A) is coherent. (Conditional Coherence)
(AC2) If A is inconsistent, then C(A) = L. (Conditional Incoherence)
(AC3) A ⊆ C(A) (Inclusion)
(AC4) If Cn(A) = Cn(B), then C(A) = C(B). (Left Logical Equivalence)
(AC5) If A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A), then C(B) ⊆ C(A). (Cut)
(AC6) If A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A), then C(A) ⊆ C(B). (Cautious Monotonicity)
(AC7) C(A) ∩ C(B) ⊆ C(Cn(A) ∩ Cn(B)). (Distribution)
(AC8) If ¬x /∈ C(A), then C(A) ⊆ C(A ∪ {x}). (Rational Monotonicity)
(AC9) C(Cn(A) ∩ Cn(B)) ⊆ C(A) ∪ C(B). (Disjunctive Rationality)
(AC10) C({x ∨ y}) ⊆ Cn(C({x}) ∪ {y}) ∪ Cn(C({y}) ∪ {x}). (Weak Disjunctive
Rationality)
(AC1)-(AC3) are included in the postulates of Olsson’s consolidation [18], except
for (AC2), which is slightly diﬀerent from Olsson’s original. He supposed that if
A is inconsistent, then C(A) = A. This diﬀerence is not essential for the following
discussion. (AC3)-(AC10) are discussed by researchers of nonmonotonic reasoning
[13,15,16,21]. We explain the meaning of these postulates as follows. If it is possible
to construct a coherent theory, then consolidation must construct such a theory
(AC1). Note that A is consistent iﬀ Cn(A) is coherent, i.e., it is possible to construct
a coherent theory from A. Otherwise, it should give up constructing such a theory,
and the original theory must only be logically closed (AC2). To construct a coherent
theory, consolidation can not eliminate any parts of an original theory (AC3). If
A and B are logically equivalent, the consolidated theories of A and B should be
equal (AC4). Adding or deleting medium lemmas should not aﬀect the result of
consolidation (AC5-AC6). If a sentence is included in the consolidations of both
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{x} and {y}, then it is also included in the consolidation of {x ∨ y} (AC7). If x is
consistent with the consolidation of A, then a sentence, included in the consolidation
of A, is also included in the consolidation of A∪{x} (AC8). If a sentence is included
in the consolidations of {x∨y}, then it is also included in the consolidation of either
{x} or {y} (AC9). (AC10) is the weaker version of (AC9).
We call (AC1)-(AC4) the basic postulates, and (AC5)-(AC10) the supplemental
postulates. In the following discussion, we will show that the basic postulates
are independent of any specialized choice functions, but the consolidation, which
satisﬁes supplemental postulates, needs the aid of rational choice.
3 Partial Meet Consolidations
In this section, we construct a consolidation function, which is equivalent with the
collection of the basic postulates in the last section. Usually, the issues about belief
revision adopt partial meet approach for the deﬁnition of the operational function.
This approach consists of three steps. First, all alternative results of the revision
are collected. Second, a selection function chooses several best solutions from all
possible alternatives. Third, the output of the revision function must be equal to
the intersection of the best solutions. In the same way, our approach consists of
three steps. We call it partial meet consolidation.
In the ﬁrst step of the consolidation functions, all alternative results of the
consolidation are collected. we introduce the set of maximal coherent supersets of
an original theory. we call it the set of extensions. Given an original theory A,
extensions are too big theories that are constructed from A. Such a construction
is justiﬁed by the principle of maximal change. We consider that an assumption
should be added when there is no reason to eliminate it. However, such theories,
constructed by the principle, seem not to be desirable for rational agent, because
these are too big. Therefore, in the second step, best big theories are selected by
some choice function, and in the ﬁnal step, a rather small theory is generated by
skepticism.
Deﬁnition 3.1 The set of extensions of A, noted by e(A), is the set such that
T ∈ e(A) iﬀ
(i) A ⊆ T ,
(ii) T is coherent, and
(iii) if T ⊂ U , then U is incoherent.
That is to say, e(A) is the set of maximal consistent sets that include A. 7 Since
we already assumed that L was logically ﬁnite, the set of all maximal consistent
sets is ﬁnite, and e(A) is obviously ﬁnite. We can consider maximal consistent sets
as possible worlds. We will use W as the set of all possible worlds. For any set S of
possible worlds, there is some A such that S = e(A).
7 A consistent set may not be coherent, but a maximal consistent set must be coherent.
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Lemma 3.2 for any S ⊆ W, S = e(∩S). Moreover, for any A, ∩e(A) = Cn(A).
Proof. Given S ⊆ W, S ⊆ e(∩S) is obvious. S ⊇ e(∩S) is shown by contradiction,
i.e., if there is some T ⊇ ∩S with T /∈ S, we must assume some proposition x1∨· · ·∨
xn such that x1 ∨ · · · ∨ xn ∈ ∩S and ¬x1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬xn ∈ T , where S = {A1, ..., An}
and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi ∈ Ai. For any T ∈ e(A), Cn(A) ⊆ T . Therefore,
∩e(A) ⊇ Cn(A). If x /∈ Cn(A), we can construct X ∈ e(A) with ¬x ∈ X, i.e.,
x /∈ ∩e(A). Thus, ∩e(A) ⊆ Cn(A). 
In the second step of the consolidation functions, a choice function selects several
best solutions from all possible alternatives. In order to select some best solutions
among the extensions, we introduce choice function.
Deﬁnition 3.3 σ is a choice function iﬀ σ(S) is a nonempty subset of S unless S
is empty in which case σ(S) = {L}, where S ⊆W.
In the third step, according to skepticism, the output of the consolidation func-
tion is equal to the intersection of the best solutions. From the above two compo-
nents, we can deﬁne a partial meet consolidation.
Deﬁnition 3.4 An operation C is a partial meet consolidation iﬀ there is some
choice function σ such that for all A,
C(A) = ∩σ(e(A)).
We can prove the following representation theorem.
Theorem 3.5 A consolidation C is a partial meet consolidation iﬀ C satisfy (AC1)-
(AC4).
Proof. The proof from left to right is easy to show. For the proof from right to
left, we suppose the function σ as follows.
(i) if S is nonempty, then σ(S) = {X ∈ S|C(∩S) ⊆ X}.
(ii) otherwise, σ(S) = {L}.
It suﬃces to show that (i) σ is a choice function, i.e., when S is nonempty, σ(S)
is a nonempty subset of S, and (ii) for all A, C(A) = ∩σ(e(A)). We can show (i)
with (AC1), (AC3), and S = e(∩S) in Lemma 3.2. For (ii), in the limiting case
that e(A) is empty, it is obvious from (AC2). When e(A) is nonempty, we can show
σ(e(A)) = {X ∈ e(A)|C(A) ⊆ X} from (AC4) and ∩e(A) = Cn(A) in Lemma 3.2.
Therefore, C(A) ⊆ ∩σ(e(A)). We will show C(A) ⊇ ∩σ(e(A)) as follows. Suppose
x ∈ ∩σ(e(A)). When we assume x /∈ C(A), we can construct some X ∈ σ(e(A))
with x /∈ X from (AC1) and (AC3), and it contradicts x ∈ ∩σ(e(A)). Therefore,
x ∈ C(A). 
4 Rational Postulates of Choice Function
In this section, we will introduce some rational postulates for choice function. These
postulates were introduced by Rott [21], but originally, these had been developed
Y. Suzuki / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 165 (2006) 177–187182
by various economists (e.g.,[2,22]). Therefore, the domain of the choice function
was not a set of possible world, and the object of the selection mechanism was a set
of potential options or alternatives in the economics sence. However, because Rott
[21] showed the various correspondence between the choice function, nonmonotonic
reasoning, and belief revision in both syntax and semantics level, we can consider
that these postulates are applicable to the selection of possible worlds.
(I) If S ⊆ S′, then S ∩ σ(S′) ⊆ σ(S).
(I−) If S ⊆ S′ and σ(S′) ⊆ S, then σ(S′) ⊆ σ(S).
(II) σ(S) ∩ σ(S′) ⊆ σ(S ∪ S′).
(II+) A ∈ σ(S) and B ∈ σ(S′), then A ∈ σ(S ∪ S′) or B ∈ σ(S ∪ S′).
(III) If S ⊆ S′ and σ(S′) ⊆ S, then σ(S) ⊆ σ(S′).
(IV) If S ⊆ S′ and σ(S′) ∩ S = ∅, then σ(S) ⊆ σ(S′).
Instead of possible worlds, we will explain the meaning of the postulates, using
the domain of all sports players, where σ selects the best players from the set of some
players in the domain. For (I), let S be the set of Spanish marathon runners, and
S′ be the set of world marathon runners. Thus, if the world champion in marathon
is a Spanish, then he must be also the Spanish marathon champion (I). For (II),
let S be the set of Judo players in the over 100 kilo class, and S′ be the set of Judo
players in the open weight. Thus, if a man is the world Judo champion in both
the over 100 kilo class and the open weight, then he must win the game contest in
which all players for the over 100 kilo class and the open weight participate (II). For
(III), let S be the set of baseball players who belong to the New York Yankees, and
S′ be the set of players of American league. Thus, if a player nominated for Golden
Globe Awards belongs to Yankees, then All the best defensive players in Yankees
must be nominated for this awards (III). For (IV), let S be the set of Australian
swimmers, and S′ be the set of world swimmers. Thus, if there is an Australian who
is a world swimming champion in the 50 meter freestyle, then all the Australian
swimming champions of each event must be the world swimming champions of each
event (IV). (IV) is diﬀerent from (III), because an American also may be a world
swimming champion at the same instant, but two players in the same defensive
position cannot be nominated. (I−) is the weaker version of (I), and (II+) is the
stronger version of (II).
We can prove the various equivalent relations between the supplemental postu-
lates of consolidation and the postulates of choice function.
Theorem 4.1 1. A consolidation C is a partial meet consolidation whose choice
function satisﬁes (I) iﬀ C satisfy (AC1)-(AC4) and (AC7).
2. A consolidation C is a partial meet consolidation whose choice function satisﬁes
(I−) iﬀ C satisfy (AC1)-(AC5).
3. A consolidation C is a partial meet consolidation whose choice function satisﬁes
(II) iﬀ C satisfy (AC1)-(AC4) and (AC10).
4. A consolidation C is a partial meet consolidation whose choice function satisﬁes
(II+) iﬀ C satisfy (AC1)-(AC4) and (AC9).
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5. A consolidation C is a partial meet consolidation whose choice function satisﬁes
(III) iﬀ C satisfy (AC1)-(AC4) and (AC6).
6. A consolidation C is a partial meet consolidation whose choice function satisﬁes
(IV) iﬀ C satisfy (AC1)-(AC4) and (AC8).
Proof. The proof from left to right is easy to show. For the proof from right to
left, we only show 1. Suppose the function σ as the proof of Theorem 3.5. We
have already shown that a consolidation C with σ is a partial meet consolidation
in Theorem 3.5. It suﬃces to show that σ satisﬁes the following property, because
Rott [21] showed that it was equivalent with (I).
σ(S ∪ S′) ⊆ σ(S) ∪ σ(S′)
Suppose that X ∈ σ(S∪S′). Then C(∩(S∪S′)) ⊆ X. From (AC7), C(∩S)∩C(∩S′) ⊆
X. Since X is a possible world, C(∩S) ⊆ X or C(∩S′) ⊆ X. When C(∩S) ⊆ X,
we can show X ∈ S from (AC3) and S = e(∩S) in Lemma 3.2. We can also show
X ∈ S′ when C(∩S′) ⊆ X. Therefore, X ∈ σ(S) ∪ σ(S′).
In the same way of 1., we can show the case of 2.to 6. 
5 Discussion
5.1 Choice and Order
In this section, we will introduce the correspondence between choice and order,
and show that our consolidation is diﬀerent from the usual skeptical reasoning with
default logic. In [22], many correspondences between rational choices and rational
relations are indicated. We can apply such an economics study to our discussion.
We will deﬁne the relational choice function as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.1 A choice function σ is relational iﬀ there is a relation  over W
such that for all S if S is nonempty, then
σ(S) = {X ∈ S|Y  X for all Y ∈ S}.
In the following discussion, X  Y is both X  Y and Y  X, and X ≡ Y is
both X  Y and Y  X. We say that  is complete iﬀ for all X and Y , X  Y
or Y  X, and  is transitive iﬀ for all X, Y , and Z, if X  Y and Y  Z, then
X  Z. We can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 A choice function σ is completely and transitively relational iﬀ it
satisﬁes (I) and (IV).
Proof. The proof from right to left is easy to show. For the proof from left to right,
we will deﬁne a relation  over W as follows.
A  B iﬀ for some S, A ∈ S and B ∈ σ(S)
Using (I) and (IV), we can derive from the deﬁnition that (i)  is complete, (ii) 
is transitive, and (iii) σ(S) = {X ∈ S|Y  X for all Y ∈ S}. 
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W Qn Rn Pn
W1 T T T
W2 T T F
W3 T F T
W4 T F F
W5 F T T
W6 F T F
W7 F F T









Fig. 1. Total Preorder over Possible Worlds
Rott [21] showed that (II) and (III) were derived from (IV). It means that a
choice function σ is completely and transitively relational iﬀ it satisﬁes (I)-(IV).
Thus, we can expect that rational choice is based on a total preorder over possible
worlds. Such an ordering is correspondent with the result of the semantic approach
to belief revision [7,12].
5.2 Nixon Diamond Example
In this subsection, we compare our consolidation with the skeptical default logic.
Suppose that Qn, Rn, and Pn represent the proposition that Nixon is a Quaker, a
Republican, and a paciﬁst. We can formalize a knowledge base with default logic.
According to the default rules, the fact that Nixon is a Quaker provides a good
reason that he is a paciﬁst, and the fact that Nixon is a Republican provides a good
reason that he is not a paciﬁst. Let CD(A) be the intersection of all extensions of
the default theory Δ = (A,D) with D = {(Qn : Pn/Pn), (Rn : ¬Pn/¬Pn)}. Then,
CD({Qn}) = Cn({Qn,Pn}), CD({Rn}) = Cn({Rn,¬Pn}), and CD({Qn,Rn}) =
Cn({Qn,Rn}).
Using a total preorder over possible worlds in the previous subsection, we also
can formalize a knowledge base with our consolidation. See Figure 1. The left
of this ﬁgure shows the truth table for the Nixon example. For example, Nixon
is not a Quaker, but a Republican and a paciﬁst in W4. The right of this ﬁgure
shows the total preorder over the possible worlds. The worlds in the lower cir-
cle can derive (Qn → Pn) ∧ (Rn → ¬Pn), but The worlds in the upper circle
can not. We will consider that a world is as plausible as another world in the
same circle, and the lower worlds precedes the upper worlds, i.e., W3 ≡ W6 ≡
W7 ≡W8 W1 ≡W2 ≡W4 ≡W5. We can construct a completely and tran-
sitively relational choice function with this total preorder. A consolidation C
with this choice function satisﬁes all postulates except (AC9). Then, we can
derive C({Qn}) = Cn({Qn,¬Rn,Pn}), C({Rn}) = Cn({¬Qn,Rn,¬Pn}), and
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C({Qn,Rn}) = Cn({Qn,Rn}). Note that C derives ¬Rn from Qn, but CD does
not. C has a policy that an assumption ¬Rn can be added to the fact Qn, because
if Nixon is a Quaker, then he is a paciﬁst, and if he is a paciﬁst, then he is not a
Republican. While CD is very skeptical, because the rule Rn : ¬Pn/¬Pn does not
allow such a backward reasoning, C is a brave reasoner who makes assumptions as
many as possible. Thus, there is various diﬀerence between CD and C.
(i) Distribution. According to (AC7), when a knowledge base accepts the fact
that Nixon is a Quaker or a paciﬁst, it must conclude that Nixon is a paciﬁst,
because it can not only conclude this proposition from the fact that Nixon is
a Quaker, but also the fact that Nixon is a paciﬁst. However, Pn /∈ CD({Qn∨
Pn}), while Pn ∈ C({Qn ∨ Pn}).
(ii) Inference from no information. Even if a knowledge base has no information,
we will expect that it replies its own thought, because it has rules “If Nixon
is a Quaker, then he is a paciﬁst.” and “If Nixon is a Republican, then he
is not a paciﬁst.” However, CD({}) = Cn({}), while C({}) = Cn({(Qn →
Pn) ∧ (Rn → ¬Pn)}).
(iii) Modus tollens. When a knowledge base has a default “If Nixon is a Quaker,
then he is a paciﬁst,” we will expect that it also has a thought “If Nixon
is not a paciﬁst, then he is not a Quaker.” However, Pn ∈ CD({Qn}), but
¬Qn /∈ CD({¬Pn}), while Pn ∈ C({Qn}) and ¬Qn ∈ C({¬Pn}).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we supposed a nonmonotonic reasoning with the medium approach
between the choice perspective and the skeptical perspective. This was based on
the idea of additive consolidation. Moreover, we could indicate that rational choice
was an important factor for the operation. The rational choice was considered to be
equivalent with a total preorder, and then, we showed that there is some diﬀerence
between a consolidation based on a total preorder and a skeptical default logic, using
Nixon diamond example. For example, our consolidation could satisfy Distribution,
infer from no information, and reason from contraposition, while the default logic
could not.
However, our discussion was insuﬃcient. We did not use any set of default con-
ditions and constraints like Poole’s default logic, called maxiconsistent set [19], and
any assumption could be added to the set of facts unless it arose incoherence. When
Pn was consistent with (Qn → Pn) ∧ (Rn → ¬Pn), the set of extensions e({Pn})
was equal to {Cn({Pn,¬Rn,Qn}), Cn({Pn,¬Rn,¬Qn})}, although we considered
that e({Pn}) should be equal to {Cn({Pn,¬Rn})} like the set of extensions for
the usual default logic. In such a case, the principle of maximal change generates
unnecessary assumptions. Thus, we should use the principle only if the premise
set is inconsistent with default conditions. Moreover, when there are constraints
over nonmonotonic reasoning, we must restrict the principle of maximal change.
Imagine that Nixon prohibits the publishment about his warlike character. In such
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a case, we cannot infer ¬Pn from Rn. Such a reasoning may be irrational, because
Makinson [16] showed that Poole’s maxiconsistent set [19] with constraints did not
satisfy (AC1) and (AC7). However, we do not think that it has any arbitrary be-
havior, and it seems to be valuable to study the relationship between nonmonotonic
reasoning with constraints and Rott’s taboo sets [21] that agents refuse to choice.
These problems will be discussed in our future works.
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